James Raymond Steward Part 1
Heroes
and Rebels in the Family Tree – James Raymond Steward
The Nile Expedition
I was digging into the family tree when I met up with
Pat Edwards. Pat is one of the newest
members of our ancestry group and has been extremely helpful in developing the
Steward family tree. I came upon some
interesting relatives in Pat’s tree and wanted to introduce you to some of
them.
Within this ancestry group, we now have descendants of
Mina Forster (1862-1941), Caroline Forster (1867-1906), and Helen Mary
Forster (1896-1915). Together, these
three sisters became the ancestral foundation of most of the members of this
group. Exceptions being Tracey Jones and
Matt Armishaw who descended along the Mann family line.
Having established some background by way of
introduction through our shared family heritage, I was intrigued by the military and family history
of James Raymond Steward. James
was born on January 9, 1875 in Great Cornard, Suffolk County, England. By the age of 20 years and 9 months, he
enlisted into the Lincolnshire Regiment in London on September 24, 1895. At that time, young James was described as 5
foot, 5-1/4 inches in height, weighing 121 pounds with Fair complexion, blue
eyes and brown hair. He completed his
military training on February 26, 1896 and was began his military duties with
the 1st Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment in England until December
27, 1897.
1st
Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment Deployed to Egypt
On December 28, 1897, the 1st Battalion,
Lincolnshire Regiment was deployed to Egypt under the orders of Gen. Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener in
preparation for the British conquest of Sudan.
From 1897 until January 3, 1900, James Raymond would remain in Egypt and
Sudan engaged in the Battle of Atbara River and other military activities in
Sudan. From there he would be deployed
to South Africa to fight in the Second Boer War. He would not return home until September 6,
1903.
The
British conquest of Sudan
British
forces invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882 to put down a nationalist revolution
hostile to foreign interests and remained there to prevent any further threat
to the khedive’s government or the possible intervention of another European
power. The consequences of this were far-reaching. A permanent British
occupation of Egypt required the inviolability of the Nile waters—without which
Egypt could not survive—not from any African state, which did not possess the
technical resources to interfere with it, but from rival European powers, which
could. Consequently, the British government, by diplomacy and military
maneuvers, negotiated agreements with the Italians and the Germans to keep them
out of the Nile valley. They were less successful with the French, who wanted
them to withdraw from Egypt.
Once it
became apparent that the British were determined to remain, the French cast
about for means to force the British from the Nile valley. In 1893 an elaborate
plan was concocted by which a French expedition would march across Africa from
the west coast to Fashoda (Kodok) on the upper Nile, where it was believed a
dam could be constructed to obstruct the flow of the Nile waters. After
inordinate delays, the French Nile expedition set out for Africa in June 1896,
under the command of Capt. Jean-Baptiste Marchand.
As reports
reached London during 1896 and 1897 of Marchand’s march to Fashoda, Britain’s
inability to insulate the Nile valley became embarrassingly exposed. British
officials desperately tried one scheme after another to beat the French to
Fashoda. They all failed, and by the autumn of 1897 British authorities had
come to the reluctant conclusion that the conquest of the Sudan was necessary
to protect the Nile waters from French encroachment. In October an
Anglo-Egyptian army under the command of Gen. Sir (later Lord) Horatio Herbert
Kitchener was ordered to invade the Sudan.
The Battle of Atbara River
In January 1898, British troops began to arrive in the Sudan from the
garrison in Egypt; 1st Royal
Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Seaforth
Highlanders and 1st Queen’s
Own Cameron Highlanders and from Malta, 1st Lincolnshire
Regiment. These battalions were brigaded under Major-General Gatacre.
Kitchener concentrated his force of British, Egyptian and Sudanese troops at
Berber, sending a Sudanese brigade further up the River Nile to the mouth of
the Atbara River to build a fort.
The Khalif’s general, the Emir Mahmoud, commanding the force of Dervishes
holding Metemmeh, around one hundred miles up the River Nile from Berber, on
the west bank, was keen to lead his forces into action against the invading
Egyptian army. The Khalif finally agreed that Mahmoud should move down the
river and attack Kitchener’s troops at Berber.
Mahmoud crossed to the east bank of the River Nile, where he joined the army
of Osman Digna, from the eastern Sudan. Despite his apparent enthusiasm for
action, it took Mahmoud a couple of weeks to cross the River Nile, under the
observation of Kitchener’s riverboats.
Mahmoud and Osman Digna finally began their advance north on 13th March 1898, marching along the
east bank of the River Nile, watched by Kitchener’s steamers.
To meet the threat, Kitchener moved his army up the river, to concentrate
behind Atbara Fort.
On 15th March 1898,
Mahmoud changed the direction of his march to the east-north-east, away from
the River Nile and towards the Atbara River, upstream of the Nile junction. His
intention now was to cross the Atbara River and circle around behind Atbara, to
attack Berber from the eastern desert. He no longer entertained the prospect of
a head-on clash with Kitchener.
In response to this move, Kitchener marched his army north, up the Atbara
River, to intercept Mahmoud’s force, arriving at Hudi on 20th March 1898.
Apparently in response to Kitchener’s move, Mahmoud’s force again changed
direction, this time to an easterly route, to cross the Atbara River even
further upstream. The next day, Kitchener arrived at Ras-El-Hudi, some fifteen
miles south of the point where the Dervishes were crossing to the east bank of
the Atbara River.
At this time of year, the Atbara River did not contain a consistent flow of
water and could be crossed on foot.
Mahmoud’s plans were in disarray. He was now too far south for his army to
march through the desert to attack Berber, his water carrying capacity being
inadequate, even for a force of desert dwellers equipped with camels.
As it was clear to Mahmoud that he was likely to be attacked, he ordered his
Dervishes to build a zeriba of thorn fences, trenches and rifle pits on the
east bank of the river, where he awaited the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian
army.
Kitchener’s infantry waited in their make-shift camp at Ras-El-Hudi, while
the cavalry under Colonel Broadwood scouted along the Atbara River to find
Mahmoud’s force.
On 30th March 1898,
Broadwood’s cavalry discovered the zeriba at Nakheila.
Kitchener was in the meantime finding it difficult to decide whether to
attack Mahmoud, or to stay in his position on the Atbara River and await a
movement by the Dervishes. Gatacre urged an attack, but Hunter, commanding the
Egyptians and Sudanese, advised caution. Finally, Hunter changed his mind and
Kitchener resolved to attack the Dervish zeriba.
On 4th April 1898,
Kitchener’s army moved a further four miles towards Nakheila.
A cavalry reconnaissance approached the zeriba and formed the view that it
was deserted. Suddenly fire was opened from the thorn walls and trenches and
the Baggara horse launched an attack on the Egyptian cavalry force.
The Egyptians conducted a spirited rear-guard action, as they withdrew to
the camp.
At sunset on
7th April 1898, the British, Egyptian and Sudanese troops of Kitchener’s
army marched out of camp, heading south towards the zeriba, the four infantry
brigades each in a square, with the four British battalions leading. At around
4am the force halted on a plateau twelve hundred yards from the zeriba.
At dawn on 8th April
1898, the army prepared for the assault on the zeriba, the brigades forming
with the British on the left, MacDonald’s brigade of three Sudanese and one
Egyptian battalion in the centre, and Maxwell’s Sudanese brigade on the right.
The flank brigades each deployed a battalion in line, with the remaining three
battalions following in column. The Cameron Highlanders formed the forward line
of the British brigade.
In the rear, on the left, Lewis’s brigade guarded the supply camels. The
Camel Corps formed a reserve in the centre.
Along the line were deployed the 24 guns, the 4 maxims and the rocket
detachment.
The Egyptian cavalry, under Broadwood, guarded the open left flank beyond
the British brigade.
To the front of the attacking brigades was the line that marked the thorn
fence of the zeriba. A war correspondent reported that there was a haze of dust
above the zeriba, as if rifle pits and trenches were still being dug.
At 6:20am, Kitchener’s four artillery batteries opened fire, methodically
bombarding every part of the Dervish camp.
A force of Baggara horsemen moved out of the rear of the zeriba and made to
attack the left flank of the army, but was driven back by fire from two of the
maxims, supported by Broadwood’s cavalry.
After a bombardment lasting some seventy-five minutes, the artillery ceased
firing and the infantry began to advance on the zeriba, halting to fire volleys
into the Dervish positions.
At about three hundred yards distance, the Dervish riflemen opened a return
fire on the advancing infantry.
With rising casualties, Kitchener’s battalions reached the zeriba. The
Camerons, the front-line battalion of the British brigade, fired into the camp,
while the Seaforths pulled the thorn hedge aside and rushed through into the
positions behind. The battalions along the line stormed through the zeriba and
engaged the Dervishes, as they emerged from their trenches and rifle pits.
The 11th Sudanese
suffered particularly heavy casualties, their position, as they pressed through
the thorn hedge, putting them opposite Mahmoud’s redoubt. Mahmoud’s personal
bodyguard opened a devastating fire that annihilated a company of the 11th, before the 10th and 11th Sudanese stormed the redoubt, wiping out the
defenders and capturing Mahmoud.
Some of the Dervishes broke out of the camp on the desert side to the east
and attempted to charge around the flank of the British first line. These
attackers were caught by the fire of the Warwicks, in the second line of the
British brigade.
Kitchener’s troops fought through the camp to the Atbara River, where they
found the Dervishes escaping across the dried river bed to the west bank and
opened fire on them.
The Baggara horse escaped south, along the Atbara River, with Osman Digna,
the commander of the eastern Dervish forces.
At 8:30am the battle was over and the bugles sounded the ‘Cease Fire’.
Mahmoud, rescued by British officers from the Sudanese soldiers who had
captured him, was brought before Kitchener.
After ransacking the Dervish camp, Kitchener’s army formed up and marched
back to their positions at Atbara Fort and Berber.
Casualties at the Battle of Atbara:
In excess of 2,000 Dervish dead were found inside the zeriba. A large
number of Dervishes were captured, most of whom were enlisted in Kitchener’s
Sudanese battalions.
Total losses in Kitchener’s army were 80 killed and 479 wounded. The leading
British battalion, 1st Queen’s
Own Cameron Highlanders suffered 44 casualties, including 3 officers killed and
1 wounded. The Seaforths suffered 22 casualties, including 6 officers killed
and wounded. 1st Royal
Warwicks suffered 11 casualties and 1st Lincolns
13 casualties.
Among the non-British troops, the Sudanese battalions suffered 375
casualties, while the Egyptian battalions suffered 14 casualties.
Battle Honour and Campaign Medal for the Battle of Atbara:
The Battle Honour of ‘Atbara’ was awarded to the four British
infantry regiments present.
The campaign medals awarded were the Queen’s Sudan Medal 1896-1898 and the
Khedive’s Sudan Medal 1896-1908, with the clasp on the Khedive’s medal of ‘The
Atbara’.
Follow-up to the Battle of Atbara:
Immediately after the battle, an attempt was made at pursuit into the desert
on the west bank of the Atbara by Colonel Lewis’s brigade, but the ground was
too difficult and the escaping Dervishes too widely dispersed. Lewis abandoned
the attempt and withdrew to the main army.
After the return to Berber, Kitchener awaited the reinforcements of British
troops considered necessary to complete the defeat of the Khalif and the
capture of Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan.
- Before his appointment to the command of the British
brigade in the Sudan, Major General Gatacre made a name for himself
commanding a brigade in the relief of Chitral, on the North-West Frontier of India in 1895. Gatacre was known to his troops as ‘Backacher’,
due to his demands upon them. Gatacre commanded a division at the
unsuccessful Battle of Stormberg,
in the South African War in 1899. This ended his active military career.
- Almost all the prisoners taken at Atbara were African
Sudanese, as the Arabs mostly fought to the last. These prisoners readily
joined the Sudanese battalions and many later fought at Omdurman against the Khalif’s
forces.
- ‘Pharaoh and the Sergeant’: Rudyard Kipling’s poem in praise of the British
non-commissioned officers who doggedly trained the Egyptian and Sudanese
battalions of the Khedive’s Egyptian army, that so distinguished
themselves in Kitchener’s campaign to re-conquer the Sudan.
Pharaoh
and the Sergeant
By Rudyard Kipling
". . . Consider
that the meritorious services of the Sergeant Instructors
attached to the Egyptian Army have been
inadequately acknowledged. . . .
To the excellence of their work is
mainly due the great improvement that has
taken place in the soldiers of H.H. the
Khedive."
Extract from
Letter written by Kipling
Comments
Post a Comment