Heroes and Rebels in the Family Tree—Arthur Ernest Page
Heroes
and Rebels in the Family Tree—Arthur Ernest Page
Arthur Ernest Page was born on July 7, 1890 in Flitwick, Bedfordshire, England to George Page 1844-1899 and Ann O’Dell 1853-1934.
George Page first married Jane Whittington (1847-1868) in
Flitwick on November 28, 1867. They had
no children and Jane died in April 1868.
After his wife’s death, George moved back home with his parents and was
working as a farm labourer. George then
married Ann O’Dell (1853-1934) in Flitwick on December 16, 1874. George and Ann had 11 children (according to
the 1911 Census. Only 10 are known).
1. Alfred George Page 1871–1917
2. Emma Page 1873–1904
3. Charlotte Page 1875–1901
4. Elizabeth Maud Page 1876–1935
5. Cicely Sarah Page 1881–1897
6. George Charles Page 1882–1900
7. Julia Page 1885–1958
8. Alice Mabel Blanche Page 1887–1971
9. Arthur Ernest Page DSM 1890–1957
10. Charles Herbert Page 1893–1941
By 1881, George had managed to pick up employment as a
labourer with The Midland Railway Company and was able to maintain a position
with the railroad until his accidental death on October 24, 1899.
“Flitwick has hardly been able to get
over the consternation and grief caused by the death of the late Vicar when
another blow has fallen, equally hard upon those whom it immediately affects,
and once more reminds them ‘That in the midst of life we are in death.’ The manifestations of grief and sorrow with
the widow and family of the poor man, Mr. George Page was knocked down on
Tuesday morning whilst actually engaged in his daily work, are very deep and
sincere on every hand. Deceased was one
of those steady, upright, and honest working men whom to know was to respect,
and whom one could always rely upon. He
was especially looked up to by his comrades.
He had been employed on the railway ever since the road was opened, and
from that date had been a valued and trustworthy servant of the company.
Deceased
was nearly fifty years of age and leaves behind a widow and nine children. The eldest, a son, is married and lives in
London; a daughter is in service at Ramsey Abbey, Huntingonshire, and another
is in service with Mr. Gray, of the ‘White Horse,’ Ampthill. The others are still at home and are,
unfortunately, totally unprovided for.”
The Bedfordshire Times and
Independent, Friday, October 27, 1899
An inquest was held following the death of George Page
and was reported in The Bedfordshire Mercury, Friday, October 27, 1899.
“Mr.
Tanqueray, Coroner for the Honour of Ampthill, held an inquest at the Nag’s
Head Inn, Westoning, on Wednesday morning, on the body of George Page, of The
Winmill-road, Denel End, Flitwick (son of Mrs. and the late Mr. Thos. Page, of
The Wheatsheaf), aged 55, a platelayer on the Midland Railway, who was knocked
down and killed by a train, about 8.45 on Tuesday. It appears that when Page started work at six
o’clock on Tuesday morning, he was told to go up the line to tighten some loose
bolts. He took with him a long-handled
spanner such as is commonly used for bolt tightening on the railway. It is surmised that about 8.45 two trains
passed the spot at which he was working, and that the noise and smoke of one
prevented him from hearing or seeing the other, and that he was knocked down
and killed instantly. Mr. Spring was
chosen foreman of the jury.
George
Scott, gardener, Flitwick, identified deceased as his uncle, whose age was 55
last April.
Elid
Aldridge, a ganger, of Westoning, said he was working on the line on the 24th
between Westoning and Flitwick. George
Page was in his gang. About 8.30 Page
was tightening some bolts about half a mile up the line. The spot where he was at work was in the
parish of Flitton. About nine o’clock,
witness went up the line and found Page lying dead in the six-foot way of the
up goods line. He had evidently been
knocked down by a passing train. His
head and face were smashed. Witness
called Sub-Inspector Smith’s attention to the body, which lay about 11 yards
from the bolt at which he had been at work. Witness believed a down train had
killed him. There had been a heavy fog
in the early morning, but it had cleared off by the time that the accident
occurred. The smoke of a train passing
on the up line might have beaten down and prevented deceased from seeing a
train approaching on the down line.
Henry
Smith, a sub-inspector, corroborated the last witness’s evidence.
Fredk.
Brooks, stationmaster at Flitwick, said that about nine o’clock he was called
to a spot about one mile south of Flitwick Station. He found the body of George Page lying in the
six-foot. He was quite dead, and was
lying with his head towards Flitwick.
His face and the side of his head were smashed. He remained till the body was removed, and
the spanner was given into the possession of the police. On its return journey, he stopped the engine
No. 1128, said his engine passed the spot about 8.45. He saw three platelayers, but did not notice
deceased, not did he know that he had knocked him down. There was no fog then, but the smoke hung
about. He passed one train about the
time that deceased was killed.
The
jury brought in a verdict of ‘Accidentally killed by a passing train.’
The
jurors gave their fees to the widow, who, it was stated, had been left with a
large family.”
The Bedfordshire
Mercury, Friday, October 27, 1899.
The Midland Railway later paid the sum of £150 to the widow
and her family.
NOTE: In the 1800s, a railroad platelayer's primary duty was to maintain the track, which included inspecting, repairing, and ensuring the safety of the railway infrastructure. This involved overseeing the condition of the rails, sleepers (the wooden ties), fishplates (connecting the rails), bolts, and other track components. They also ensured the track was aligned correctly and checked for any wear and tear.
His service during World War I included service aboard HMS Clio,
Pembroke, President II, Daedalus, Pembroke II and Courageous. But it was during the time he served aboard
HMS Courageous when he was temporarily assigned aboard HMS Vindictive,
that he participated in the operations against Zeebrugge and Ostend on the
Night of the 22nd-23rd April, 1918. For
his service during this operation, Arthur Ernest Page was awarded the
Distinguished Service Medal. In
addition, his name was added to the balloting for the Victoria Cross. His name was not selected for this high
honour. (More is written about the
ballot for the Victoria Cross in the details of the raid below.)
After the end of his service in the Royal Navy, Arthur
settled down and married Marha Annie Pepper in Bedford, Bedfordshire, England
on January 24, 1928. Their son was John Eaton Page and he was born on May 10,
1928 and died November 9, 2006.
Arthur Ernest Page was awarded the Distinguished Service
Medal for his service in the Royal Navy during the naval operations in World
War I known as the Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids.
Arthur Ernest Page, DSM, died at the age of 67 on August 13,
1957 in Bedford, Bedfordshire, England.
A summary of the Zeebruge and Ostend raids is provided below
with a more detailed story from Wikipedia at the bottom of the story for those
with an interest in military history.
Summary
The Zeebrugge Raid was undertakento block the entrance to
the canal linking Zeebrugge to Bruges, preventing German naval activity. The
plan was for British forces, led by Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, to use
blockships (old cruisers packed with concrete) and landing parties to attempt
to block the canal entrance.
The raid involved significant casualties for the British,
including the loss of the HMS Vindictive. While two blockships were
successfully scuttled in the mouth of the canal, the Germans quickly reopened
the port. The bold nature of the raid, which involved crossing mined
waters and attacking under heavy fire, was seen as a significant victory
despite its limited operational impact.
The Ostend Raid was similar to Zeebrugge, with the intent to
block the entrance to the canal linking Ostend to Bruges. A smaller force
was dispatched to Ostend to sink two blockships.
The Ostend raid was a complete failure, with both blockships
failing to reach their target and the British force suffering heavy
casualties. The failure of the Ostend raid highlighted the strong German
defenses and the limited success of the overall operation.
The raids, while garnering significant attention and moral
support, did not achieve their primary goal of significantly hindering German
naval operations. The Germans were able to quickly reopen the ports and
resume U-boat and destroyer operations. The raids resulted in high
casualties for the British, including the loss of the HMS Vindictive.
Despite their operational shortcomings, the raids were
celebrated for their boldness and the heroism of the participants, leading to
the award of eleven Victoria Crosses.
Below is the summary of the awards given for the operations
against Zeebrugge and Ostend which include the Distinguishe Service Medal for
Arthur Ernest Page, DSM, as published in the London Gazette.
30807 - 19
JULY 1918
ZEEBRUGGE
AND OSTEND RAIDS
Honours for
Services in the Operations against Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Night
of the 22nd-23rd April, 1918.
To receive
the Distinguished Service Medal.
H.M.S. "Vindictive."
Ch. Air Mech. Clifford Armitage, R.N.A.S., O.N. F6981.
E.R.A., 4th Cl., Norman Carroll, O.N. M17679 (Ch.).
E.R.A., 3rd Cl., Herbert Cavanagh, O.N. M1111 (Po.).
Sto., 1st Cl., William Crawford, O.N. K34438 (Ch.).
M.A.A. Charles George Dunkason, O.N. 191301 (Po.).
Arm. Arthur William Evans, O.N. M7148 (Ch.).
Ldg. Sig. Albert James Gamby, O.N. J11326 (Ch.).
A.B. Arthur Geddes, O.N. J30822 (Ch.).
E.R.A., 5th Cl., Herbert Alfred Harris, O.N. M6218 (Po.).
Sto. P.O. Thomas Haw, O.N. 306429 (Po.).
Sto., 1st Cl., James Lewis Hayman, O.N. K35627
(Dev.).
P.O. Herbert Jackson, O.N. 213767 (Ch.).
A.B. Richard Ellis Makey, O.N. 219228 (Po.).
S.B.S.
Arthur Ernest Page, O.N. M960 (Ch.).
Ch. Sto. Alfred Edward Sage, O.N. 281683 (Ch.).
Sto., 1st Cl., Joseph Smith, O.N. K24538 (Dev.).
E.R.A., 4th Cl., Alan Thomas, O.N. M16493 (Dev.).
P.O. Thomas Wood, O.N. 171903 (Ch.).
Genealogy:
Arthur Ernest Page DSM 1890-1957 was the husband of Martha Annie Pepper
1905-1987 and her father was John Samuel Broughton 1871-1953 and his brother
was George Broughton 1869-1915 and his son was George Henry Broughton 1890-1957
and his daughter was Mollie Ann Broughton 1923-2009 and her husband was Norman
Leonard Smith 1919-2000 and his father was Albert Smith 1873-1960 and his
mother was Mary Ann Murrell 1841-1920 and her sister was Sarah Caroline Murrell
1855-1931 who was the mother of Gilbert Maurice Mann 1892-1952. (Gilbert was the husband of my grandmother
Gladys Adams).
Note to Genealogy Researchers: Do not confuse George Page born in
1844 in Flitwick, Bedfordshire, England with George Page born about 1843 in
Clophill, Bedfordshire England (civil parish of Rotherhithe) who married Jane
Lincoln whose children are Daniel, Alfred, Henry, Jane Walter and Alice. Many
of the census reports look similar since they report George Page married to
Jane. Our family is related to George
Page and his wife Jane Whittington.
A More Detailed
Description of the Raids
Operations against Zeebrugge and Ostend on the
Night of the 22nd-23rd April, 1918.
On the night of April 22-23, 1918, British forces launched raids against Zeebrugge and Ostend, aiming to block German U-boat and destroyer access from the Bruges naval base. While the Zeebrugge raid initially gained some traction with the scuttling of blockships, the Ostend raid was a complete failure. Despite high casualties and the eventual reopening of the ports, the raids were hailed as a British victory due to the bold nature of the operation.
 |
| Diagram of Zeebrugge harbour after the raid |
The Zeebrugge Raid (Dutch: Aanval op de haven van Zeebrugge; French: Raid sur Zeebruges) on 23 April 1918, was an attempt by the Royal Navy to block the Belgian port of Bruges-Zeebrugge. The British intended to sink obsolete ships in the canal entrance, to prevent German vessels from leaving port. The port was used by the Imperial German Navy as a base for U-boats and light shipping, which were a threat to Allied control of the English Channel and southern North Sea. Several attempts to close the Flanders ports by bombardment failed and Operation Hush, a 1917 plan to advance up the coast, proved abortive. As ship losses to U-boats increased, finding a way to close the ports became urgent and the Admiralty became more willing to consider a raid.
An attempt to
raid Zeebrugge was made on 2 April 1918 but was cancelled at the last moment,
after the wind direction changed and made it impossible to lay a smokescreen to
cover the ships. Another attempt was made on 23 April, with a concurrent attack
on Ostend. Two of three blockships were scuttled in the narrowest part of the
Bruges–Ostend Canal and one of two submarines rammed the viaduct linking the
shore and the mole, to trap the German garrison. The blockships were sunk in
the wrong place and after a few days the Germans had opened the canal to
submarines at high tide. Lessons were learned during the operation that would
be put to use in the Second World War.
Strategic
developments
At the end of
1916 a combined operation against Borkum, Ostend and Zeebrugge had been
considered by Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commander of the Coast of Ireland
Station. The plan was rejected due to the difficulty of supplying a landing
force and the vulnerability of such a force to a land counter-attack;
subsequent proposals were rejected for the same reasons. A bombardment of the
Zeebrugge lock gates under cover of a smoke screen was studied by Vice-Admiral
Sir Reginald Bacon, commander of the Dover Patrol and the Admiralty in late
1915 but was also rejected as too risky. In 1916, Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt
proposed an attack to block Zeebrugge, which was rejected. Tyrwhitt suggested a
more ambitious operation to capture the mole and the town as a prelude to
advancing on Antwerp. Bacon was asked to give his opinion and rejected the
plan, as did the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral
Roger Keyes was appointed director of the Plans Division at the Admiralty in
October 1917 and on 3 December submitted another plan for the blocking of
Zeebrugge and Ostend using old cruisers in a night attack in the period from 14
to 19 March. Bacon also proposed an operation on 18 December, which combined
Tyrwhitt's landing on the mole with a blocking operation. A monitor, HMS Sir
John Moore, was to land 1,000 troops on the mole, the monitor HMS General
Craufurd was to bombard the lock gates and fortifications from short range; the
blockships were to enter the harbour in the confusion. The raid was proposed in
1917 by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe but was not authorised until Keyes adapted
Bacon's plan for a blocking operation, to make it difficult for German ships
and submarines to leave the port. The raid was approved in January 1918 and
volunteer crews were obtained from the Grand Fleet "to perform a hazardous
service".
Tactical developments
Graphic depiction
of the raid from Popular Science magazine, July 1918
The possibility
of a landing on the Belgian coast was not abandoned, despite the number of
rejected plans and early in 1917, Bacon assisted in the planning of Operation
Hush, landings by the three brigades of the 1st Division around Middelkerke at
the northern extremity of the Western Front. The operation was dependent on the
advance of the British armies in the Third Battle of Ypres and had no influence
on events at Zeebrugge and Ostend. If landings at the ports were successful,
the forces involved would be doomed unless they were relieved by the advance of
the armies in Flanders. Bacon devised a plan to destroy the lock gates at
Zeebrugge by bombardment with the 15-inch guns of the monitors HMS Erebus, HMS
Terror and HMS Marshal Soult.
The bombardment
would have to be undertaken at long range, because of the danger of return fire
from the Kaiser Wilhelm battery at Knokke and meant aiming at a target 90 by 30
sq ft (8.4 by 2.8 m2) in area at a range of 13 nmi (15 mi; 24 km), using directions
from an artillery-observation aircraft. Bacon calculated that 252 shells would
be necessary and that it would take at least 84 minutes to fire them. If the
attempt began with surprise and the bombardment ships were obscured by a smoke
screen, the German guns at Knokke might not have enough time accurately to
return fire before the bombardment ended. Bacon thought that the destruction of
the lock gates was worth the sacrifice of a monitor but that risking all three
for no result was impossible to avoid.
The plan needed a
rare combination of wind, tide and weather; to obtain surprise the monitors
would need to be in position before dawn. Mist and low cloud would make
artillery observation from an aircraft impossible and the wind would have to be
blowing from a narrow range of bearings or the smoke screen would be carried
over the ships and out to sea, exposing them to view from the shore. Such
conditions were unlikely to recur for several days, making a bombardment on the
following day most unlikely. The bombardment force sailed for Zeebrugge three
times but changes in the weather forced a return to England each time. On 11
May, Bacon ordered another attempt for the next day; a buoy was laid 15 nautical
miles (17 mi; 28 km) to the north-west of the mole as a guide and a second buoy
was placed in the bombardment position. A bearing was taken from the buoy to
the base of the mole at Zeebrugge by a ship sailing from the buoy to the mole,
despite a mist which reduced visibility to a mile and the ship advancing
perilously close to German shore batteries. The ship returned to the buoy by
4:45 a.m., with the bearing and distance. The bombardment ships had taken
position, the Motor Launches had formed a line, ready to generate the
smokescreen and the escorts formed a square around the monitors. Five
destroyers zigzagged around the flotilla as a screen against U-boats, the
minesweepers began operating around the monitors and the covering force cruised
in the distance, ready to intercept a German destroyer sortie.
Zeebrugge, 12
May 1917
The bombardment
opened late because of the need to tow Marshal Soult, slowing the armada and
also by a haze off the harbour. Two Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS)
artillery-observation aircraft from Dunkirk, which had taken off at 2:00 a.m.,
had to wait from 3:00 a.m. over Zeebrugge for almost two hours. The aircraft
were met by seven Sopwith Pups from 4 (Naval) Squadron RNAS, which patrolled
the coast from 5:45 a.m. as six Sopwith Triplanes of 10 (Naval) Squadron RNAS
flew over the fleet. One of the artillery-observation aircraft had engine
trouble and force-landed in the Netherlands; the other ran short of petrol.
Firing from the monitors was opened just after 5:00 a.m. and at first fell
short; many of the shells failed to explode, which left the aircraft unable to
signal the fall of shot. The accuracy of the bombardment improved soon after;
Marshal Soult hit the target with its twelfth shell and Erebus with its
twenty-sixth. Terror was most hampered by the loss of one of the aircraft and
by dud shells; only forty-five of the 250 shells fired were reported and the
observation aircraft had to return because of fuel shortage at 5:30 a.m.,
leaving the last half-hour of the bombardment reliant on estimated corrections
of aim. Two relieving aircraft also had
engine trouble and failed to arrive.
In the first hour
of the bombardment, German retaliation was limited to anti-aircraft fire and
attempts to jam the wireless of the artillery-observation aircraft. When the
Pups from 4 (Naval) Squadron arrived, twice their number of German Albatros
fighters engaged them and some of the aircraft from over the fleet, which
joined in the dogfight. The British claimed five German aircraft shot down and
the fleet was able to complete the bombardment. A third patrol later shot down
a German seaplane into Ostend harbour and lost one fighter. At 6:00 a.m. the ships weighed anchor, just
as the Kaiser Wilhelm battery opened fire. Two seaplanes which attempted to
approach the fleet were driven off by British fighter seaplanes, which escorted
the fleet home. Bacon returned with the impression that the bombardment had
succeeded but aerial photographs taken the following week revealed that about
fifteen shells had landed within a few yards of the lock gates on the western
side and four shells had fallen just as close on the eastern side. The basin
north of the locks had been hit and some damage caused to the docks but
Zeebrugge remained open to German destroyers and U-boats. The Admiralty
concluded that had the monitors been ready to fire as soon as the observer in
the artillery-observation aircraft signalled or if the shoot had been reported
throughout, the lock gates would have been hit. Bacon made preparations to
bombard Ostend harbour.
Ostend, 5 June
1917
Attempts to bombard Ostend on 26 and 27 May were abandoned because of poor weather but on 4 June, the bombardment ships sailed for the Ratel Bank off Ostend; the bombardment force was smaller and the covering force larger than for the Zeebrugge operation, since surprise was less likely. The Harwich Force provided four light cruisers, a flotilla leader and eight destroyers as a covering force off the Thornton Bank and a second wave of four light cruisers and eight destroyers to guard against an attack from the Schouwen Bank. The firing buoy and its bearing and range from the target were established using the Zeebrugge method and the escorting ships formed a square around the bombardment ships.
German destroyers
were sighted east of the Ratel Bank at 1:42 a.m. by HMS Lance and Lochinvar
which were steering towards Ostend to establish the range and bearing of the
target from the sighting buoy. The German destroyers frustrated two attempts to
enter the harbour, which left the fleet without sighting data and reliant on
dead reckoning. At about 2:30 a.m., gunfire was heard from the direction of the
covering force to the north and at about 3:00 a.m. the bombardment force Motor
Launches began to lay a smokescreen. At dawn the coast became visible and Bacon
corrected the position by taking a bearing on Sint-Petrus-en-Pauluskerk. (Sts.
Peter and Paul Church) The bombardment commenced at 3:20 a.m., German coastal
guns replied within minutes and fired accurately at Erebus and Terror but with
no effect.
The British
bombardment ceased at 4:00 a.m.; the fleet weighed anchor at 4:20 a.m. and
withdrew northwards. The covering force guarded the ships from a point 5 nautical
miles distant, having engaged two German destroyers as they tried to reach
Zeebrugge, sinking S20. Ostend was a
larger target than Zeebrugge and could be seen from the sea, which made
accurate shooting easier. The dockyard was hit by twenty out of 115 shells and
intelligence reports noted the sinking of a lighter, a UC-boat, damage to three
destroyers and that the German command had been made anxious about the security
of the coast. Had Bacon been able to repeat the shore bombardments at short
intervals, naval operations from the Flanders coast by the Germans would have
been much more difficult to organise. More bombardments were planned but these
were all postponed because essential conditions of tide and weather were not
met. After several months, the bombardments resumed but the Germans had been
able to repair the damage. As the long methodical bombardments of Ostend and
Zeebrugge had proved impractical, Bacon attached a large monitor to the forces
which patrolled coastal barrages, ready to exploit opportunities of favourable
wind and weather to bombard Zeebrugge and Ostend, which occurred several times
but had no effect on the working of the ports.
German
defences
By 1917 the
German defences on the Flanders coast included Kaiser Wilhelm II, a heavy artillery battery at Knokke, east of the
Bruges Canal, of four 12 in (300 mm) guns, with a range of
41,000 yd (23 mi; 37 km) and the Tirpitz battery of four 11 in (280 mm) guns, with a range of
35,000 yd (20 mi; 32 km), 1.5 mi (2.4 km) west of
Ostend. Two more batteries were being built in early 1917 and between the main
defences were many mobile guns, entrenchments and machine-gun nests. The only
vulnerable part of the German defensive system was the lock gates at Zeebrugge,
the destruction of which would make the canal to Bruges tidal and drastically
reduce the number of ships and submarines that could pass along it.
British
preparations
An appeal was made to the Grand Fleet for volunteers for special service on 23 February 1918. Very few of the participants were aware of the objective. The cruisers involved in the blockade, including HMS Vindictive, were equipped in Chatham by over 2,000 workers for the special fitting out or (in the case of the ships to be sunk) stripping out of unnecessary equipment, including their masts. Iris, Daffodil and the submarines were converted in Portsmouth. The fleet made its rendezvous at Swin Deep, about 8 nmi (9.2 mi; 15 km) south of Clacton. The first opportunity for the raid was early April 1918 and on 2 April the fleet sailed and Zeebrugge was bombed by 65 Squadron from Dunkirk. The success of the raid depended upon smokescreens to protect the British ships from the fire of German coastal artillery but the wind direction was unfavourable and the attack was called off. Zeebrugge was visible to the fleet and the fleet to the Germans in Zeebrugge; seventy-seven ships of all sizes, some with their lights already switched off, had to make a sharp turn to the west to return to their bases.
Raid
A second attempt
was made on 23 April, in conjunction with a raid on the neighbouring harbour of
Ostend. The raid began with a diversion against the mile-long Zeebrugge mole,
led by the old cruiser, Vindictive, with two Mersey ferries, Daffodil and Iris II.
The three ships were accompanied by two old submarines, which were filled with
explosives to blow up the viaduct connecting the mole to the shore. Vindictive
was to land a force of 200 sailors and a battalion of Royal Marines, at the
entrance to the Bruges–Ostend Canal, to destroy German gun positions. During
the landing the wind changed and the smokescreen to cover the ship was blown
offshore. The marines immediately came under massed fire and suffered many
casualties. Vindictive was spotted by German gunners and forced to land in the
wrong place, resulting in the loss of the marines' heavy gun support.
Eventually the submarine HMS C3 commanded by Lieutenant Richard Sandford,
destroyed the viaduct when its demolition charge exploded.
The attempt to
sink three old cruisers to block the flow of traffic in and out of the Port of
Bruges-Zeebrugge failed. The failure of the attack on the Zeebrugge mole
resulted in the Germans concentrating their fire on the three blocking ships,
HMS Thetis, Intrepid and Iphigenia, which were filled with
concrete. Thetis, which had been ordered to ram the lock gates at the end of
the channel, was severely damaged by German fire and collided with a submerged
wire net, which disabled both of its engines. Starting to sink before reaching
the main channel, the crew of Thetis coaxed enough power from the engines to
bring it over a dredged part of the outer channel and scuttled the ship. The
two other ships were sunk at the narrowest point of the canal. The submarines C1 (Lieutenant A. C. Newbold)
and C3 were old, manned by volunteer crews of one other officer and four
ratings. They had five tons of amatol packed into their fore-ends and were to
be driven into the viaduct and then blown up, to prevent reinforcement of the
German garrison on the mole. The crews were to abandon their submarines shortly
before the collision with the viaduct, leaving the submarines to steer
themselves automatically. During the passage from Dover, C1 parted with its tow
and arrived too late to take part in the operation. Lieutenant Sandford
commanding HM Submarine C.3, skillfully placed the vessel between the piles of
the viaduct which connected the Mole with the shore, before laying his fuse and
abandoning her. He disdained to use the gyro steering which would have enabled
him and his crew to abandon the submarine at a safe distance, but preferred to
make sure that his mission would be successful.
Lieutenant Richard Sandford was awarded the Victoria Cross for his
heroic actions in the Zeebrugge Raid.
Zeebrugge
Channel obstructed after the raid; (Left to right) HMS Intrepid, HMS Iphigenia and HMS Thetis. The obstructions are not enough to prevent U-boats from sailing out at high tide.
In 1931, the
official historian, Sir Henry Newbolt, wrote that before the raid, two
submarines entered or left the Flanders bases each day and continued at that
rate during the week after the raid. The block ships were sunk in the wrong
position and the canal was only obstructed for a few days. The Germans removed
two piers in the western bank of the canal near the block ships and dredged a
channel through the silt near their sterns. At high tide, U-boats could move
along the new channel past the block ships.
The average
number of passages was maintained until June, when the rate fell to about one
submarine per day, to an extent due to a bombardment of Zeebrugge on 9 June.
After the damage was repaired, the rate of U-boat traffic did not return to the
pre-raid level. Newbolt considered that the reduced traffic was caused by
the recall of some U-boats to Germany in June, after reports that operations in
the Dover Straits had become too dangerous. The usual remedy, of increasing the
number of destroyer raids, was not possible because of the difficulty in using
Zeebrugge as a harbour.
Newbolt wrote
that the raid on Zeebrugge was part of an anti-submarine campaign which had
lasted for five months, using patrols and minefields to close the Straits and
which continued despite the most destructive sortie achieved by the Germans
during the war. The British anti-submarine measures inflicted a steady
attrition of the Flanders U-boats and the attack on Zeebrugge came when the
German blockade of Britain was supposed to have reduced drastically the
resources and endurance of the British Empire. News of the raid was skillfully
exploited to raise Allied morale and to foreshadow victory Possunt quia posse videntur ("They can because they think
they can"). Bacon wrote in 1931 that he was a seagoing commander with
intimate knowledge of the tidal and navigational conditions in the Ostend and
Zeebrugge areas; operational failures were due in part to the appointment of
Keyes (an Admiralty man) and his changes to plans Bacon had laid.
Ostend
Ostend had been
attacked at the same time as the attempt on Zeebrugge but this effort was a
failure. Believing the Zeebrugge raid to have been effective, the British
undertook the Second Ostend Raid on 9 May, in which Vindictive and
another cruiser HMS Sappho were sunk as a blockships. The plan took
guidance from the experience gained at Zeebrugge.
Casualties
Of the 1,700 men
involved in the operation, S. F. Wise recorded in 1981 that 300 were wounded
and more than 200 killed. Kendall gave figures of 227 dead and 356 wounded. The
destroyer HMS North Star was sunk. Among the dead was Wing Commander
Frank Brock, the man who devised and commanded the smoke screen. Most of the casualties were buried in England
either because they died of their wounds enroute or because the survivors
recovered their bodies. The Zeebrugge plot of St James's Cemetery, Dover has
nine unidentified men and fifty named men who died on 23 April 1918 but most
fatalities were returned to their families for local burial. The Germans
suffered casualties of eight dead and sixteen wounded.
Victoria Cross
The Zeebrugge
Raid was promoted by Allied propaganda as a British victory and eight Victoria
Crosses were awarded. The 4th Battalion Royal Marines was awarded the Victoria
Cross for the action. Under Rule 13 of the Victoria Cross warrant, a ballot was
stipulated to select the recipients. Victoria Cross rules specify that four
Victoria Crosses should be awarded this way (one to an officer, one to an NCO
and two to other ranks) but they were not observed and only two Victoria
Crosses were awarded. This was the last time that Victoria Crosses were awarded
by ballot, although the rule remained within the Victoria Cross warrant. In a
mark of respect to those involved in the raid, the Royal Marines have never
raised another 4th Battalion.
A ballot was
similarly held for the crews of the assault vessels for the Zeebrugge Mole (Vindictive, Royal
Daffodil and Iris II) and the raiding parties. Victoria
Crosses were awarded to Able Seaman Albert Edward McKenzie (Vindictive)
and Captain Alfred Carpenter (commander of Vindictive). Lieutenant-Commander
Arthur Harrison and Lieutenant-Commander George Bradford who led raiding
parties from Vindictive and Iris II received posthumous VCs.
Sergeant Norman Finch, Royal Marine Artillery, was selected by the 4th
Battalion. Richard Sandford, commander of the submarine C.3 and Captain Edward
Bamford who led the 4th Battalion were also awarded.
Comments
Post a Comment