The Kirstead Taylors Part 3

The Kirstead Taylors

A Newspaper cutting 'Kirstead Family Don Khaki', a captioned photograph montage of the six Taylor brothers in uniform, the sons of Mrs. Mary Ann Taylor and the late James Taylor of 42 Kirstead Ling, Brooke, Norwich. Three of the brothers were killed in June - July 1916, and are remembered on the Kirstead Green War Memorial.

John Thomas Taylor (1881-    ).  Not much is known about John Thomas Taylor.  John Thomas was born on September 15, 1881 and was the 5^th child born to James and Mary Taylor.  In 1891, at age 9 he was still attending school.  By 1901, at age 19, he was boarding with Jonathan Parker’s family in Loddon, Norfolk and worked as a milkman on a cattle farm.  He was still single at that time according to the 1901 Census.

In 1916, John Thomas was living with his mother Mary Ann at 42 Kirstead Ling Rd. Norwich.  It is believed he was living with his mother until she died in 1927.   In 1939 he was living at Cottage Syderstone Rd. #10, Walshingham District, Norfolk.  He was still single and working as a farm labourer at age 58.  No record of military service was ever found for John Thomas.  He may well be the only son of James and Mary Ann Taylor who never joined in military service.  Nothing more is known about John Thomas Taylor.

 

 

George Alfred Taylor (1883-1916) was born on April 12, 1883 in Kirstead, Norfolk, England.  George was the 6^th child of James and Mary Ann Taylor.  As a young man and much like his father and brothers, George worked as an agricultural labourer until joining the Army in the Norfolk Regiment on September 3, 1914.  He trained in the army in England until his unit was deployed to France on July 25, 1915, to support the British Expeditionary Force serving under Field Marshal Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces during the Battle of the Somme. 

George never returned home and was listed as killed in action.  For his service, Private George Alfred Taylor would be awarded the 1914-15 Star, the British War Medal and the Victory Medal.  These awards were mailed, posthumously, to his mother Mary Ann Taylor.  George was the last of three sons that Mary Ann Taylor would lose during the Great War.  Less than a month earlier, she had already been notified of the death of George’s younger brothers, Albert William and Ernest Edward.  Both killed in action in France.  And all of this came soon after the loss of her husband James in December 1915.

Private George Alfred Taylor, 13326, (pictured in the montage bottom center), 8th Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, Killed in Action in France & Flanders on 19th July 1916. Aged 33. Born Kirkstead. Enlisted Norwich.  Commemorated: Thiepval Memorial, Somme, France. Pier and Face 1 C and 1 D.  The Thiepval Memorial, the Memorial to the Missing of the Somme, bears the names of more than 72,000 officers and men of the United Kingdom and South African forces who died in the Somme sector before 20 March 1918 and have no known grave. Over 90% of those commemorated died between July and November 1916. The 8th Battalion was part of the 9th  Division, which took part in the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, the second phase of the Battle of the Somme, on 14th July 1916.  Below is a pretty good video of the Battle of Bazentin Ridge and will help understand what happened on that day.  Watch for the placement on the map in the video of the 9^th Division near Delville Wood.

The Battle of Bazentin Ridge 14 July 1916: Storm of Steel Military History - YouTube

The Battle of Bazentin Ridge

A subsidiary attack of the Somme Offensive, and having captured Mametz Wood on 12 July, the British moved onwards toward High Wood in a continuation of the push through German lines.  The Battle of Bazentin Ridge, which ran from 14-17 July 1916 and comprised part of the second phase of the Somme Offensive, was launched primarily by Reserve Army (twelve battalions) with Rawlinson's Fourth Army providing a further battalion, on a front extending from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood.

Opened at dawn on the 14th (unusually so; Douglas Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief, was suspicious of night attacks), and preceded by a short sharp five-minute artillery bombardment - just enough time to send exposed German defenders to their dugouts - the infantry moved forward.  A notable success, Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit were secured within a matter of hours, with Longueval (skirting Delville Wood) following shortly afterwards.

Having established a position at Bazentin-le-Petit it became apparent to the British that High Wood itself was deserted; a large gap in the German lines was waiting to be exploited.  Permission was sought from headquarters to dispatch infantry into the wood.  However it was instead decided that here was an ideal scenario for the use of cavalry who could, it was stated, move far more quickly than infantry and may even break right through to Bapaume.

During the delay between the request for an infantry advance into the wood being sent - around 9am - and midday, by which time still no news of a cavalry advance had been given, German defenders were moving slowly back into the wood, effectively plugging the hole in their lines.  By the time the cavalry were finally sent forwards, at around 7pm, the Germans had established sufficient defences to be able to decimate the oncoming British with machine gun fire.

Despite the costly failure of the attack upon High Wood, the cavalry nevertheless secured a line from the wood to Longueval.  That night the British, under heavy fire, attempted to establish a line inside the wood, in readiness for an attack upon the German forces situated in the north-western half of the wood on the following day.

However British headquarters had resolved instead to launch an attack upon Martinpuich in the north, overlooking the reality that the Germans had not yet been fully cleared from High Wood.  Midway between Bazentin-le-Petit and Martinpuich, and clipping the edge of High Wood - where the German troops were still in residence - was sited a formidable German line of defence known as as the Switch Line.  

In launching an attack upon Martinpuich the British would find themselves open to enfilading fire from the wood; therefore, a simultaneous attack from the western side of the wood, directed at the German position, was launched, repeatedly and without success.  The consequences for the attacking 33rd Division towards Martinpuich was devastating.

Later that evening the British withdrew entirely from High Wood.

In July, the British suffered 158,786 casualties on the Somme, the French 49,859 (a combined total of 208,645 casualties) and the German 2nd Army suffered 103,000, 49.4 per cent of Allied casualties.

After the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, the British tried to straighten the salient at Delville Wood by advancing on both flanks, to reach High Wood and to capture Pozières on the left (northern) flank for good jumping-off positions for another general attack. The Germans tried to eliminate the salient at Delville Wood, to retain ground which shielded German positions from view and overlooked (gave observation over) British positions.   It was during this phase of operations that Private George Alfred Taylor was killed on July 19, 1916.  For the rest of July and August, both sides fought for control of the three areas but struggled to maintain a high tempo of operations because of ammunition shortages, high casualties and wet weather which reduced visibility and made movement much more difficult. Both sides were reduced to piecemeal attacks and piecemeal defence on narrow fronts, except for a few bigger, wider-front attacks. Until September, most attacks were defeated by defensive fire power and the inclement weather, which frequently turned the battlefield into a mud-slough.

 

Below is the 8^th Norfolk Battalion War Diary for July 19, 1916 which describes the battalion actions which led up to the death of Private George Alfred Taylor.  Private Taylor was assigned to "B" Company.

On the day

“Wednesday 19th July 1916. Day 19

Delville Wood

Fighting continued in Delville Wood all day. 53 Bde (18th Div) had been sent to reinforce 9th Div. 8th Norfolks attacked from southwest of Longueval at 7am and occupied the southern part of Delville Wood. The 10th Essex, 6th Royal Berkshire Regt and 8th Suffolks were sent to the attack with little success.”

Battalion War Diary

Talus Boise Salient 19th July. At 1.30 am Brigade Major arrived at Battalion Headquarters stating that Battalion was to proceed to valley north of MONTAUBAN and counter-attack as soon as possible on DELVILLE WOOD. Colonel and Adjutant immediately proceeded to Brigade Headquarters in MARICOUT and were then given the orders for the attack, in the meantime, Battalion proceeded to the valley at about S.22.c and d under Major L. Fletcher and remained there until the arrival of the Colonel and the Adjutant.

CO [Commanding Officer] and Adjutant arrived in this valley at about 4.45am and found that the Battalion had been there 10 or 12 minutes. The Colonel immediately sent for Company Commanders and gave out orders.

5.10am Message was sent to Brigade saying that we were ready to be in our attacking position at S W [southwest] corner of the wood at 6.15 am.

5.15am Brigade Intelligence Officer arrived and informed us that South Africans stated they were holding a line running North and West along BUCHANAN STREET, thence west along PRINCES STREET and the southern portion of the Village.

The orders of the Battalion were, that we were to take the whole of the South portion of the Wood from West to East, as far up as PRINCES STREET, the middle ride of the wood and that while this operation was being carried out, a barrage would be on the North portion of the wood, North of PRINCES STREET, and directly the south portion of the wood was cleared, the 10Bn.the Essex Regiment and the 6th Royal Berkshire Regiment would form up just south of PRINCES STREET and the 8th Bn the Suffolk Regiment in the Village, and then take the North of the Wood and the North of the Village, and that then the 8 Bn, the Norfolk Regiment would take over the whole wood and hold it with 16 strong points round the edge.

Battalion orders were that “A” Company was to be the right attacking company, “B” Company the left with “C” Company in support and “D” Company in reserve. “C” Company was responsible for dropping posts from West to East along PRINCES STREET as the attack proceeded.

“A” and “B” Companies moved off from the Valley S.22.d at 5.30 am.

Just before arriving at the S W [southwest] corner of the wood “A” Company deployed and “B” company came up on the left of “A” to follow suit, but “B” Company was fired on by heavy Machnie Gun Fire from just North of Princes Street and had to come round and deploy on the right of “A” Company, which at the same time eased along to their left up to PRINCES STREET making room on their right for “B” Company. This had considerably delayed the deployment and on receipt of messages from “A” and “B” Companies, Brigade was informed that attack could not commence until 7.15 am and was requested to keep the barrage on the South Portion of the Wood until that hour.

7.15am. Attack went forward well on the right, and “B” Company had little difficulty in reaching CAMPBELL STREET about 7.45am, but on the left “A” Company were very badly held up by enfilade machine gun fire coming from just North of PRINCES STREET. The Battalion Bombers were working along this flank but were not able to go over PRINCES STREET to tackle the machine gun owing to the fact of our own barrage that was on this portion of the wood. The two left platoons of “A” Company suffered very heavy casualties, both their officers, 2nd Lieutenant H M MacNicol and 2nd Lieutenant B W Benn being killed, accordingly a platoon from “C” Company went up in support.

8.15am. Position of the line was now as follows:

“B” company were on the line CAMPBELL STREET as far as the centre of this street and thence “A” Company in a diagonal line running N.W up to the end of BUCHANAN STREET with 2nd Lieutenant Gundry White, a platoon of the Reserve Company and a few posts of “C” Company held the PRINCES STREET line west of BUCHNAN STREET.

9 am. “B” Company were able to advance their right, half way between CAMPBELL STREET and KING STREET along the south edge of the Wood but were held up by machine gun fire and suffered fairly heavily. A platoon from the Support Company having been sent up under Lieutenant H V Hughes, the machine gun at the south end of KING STREET was captured and the personnel with it killed. At the same time “A” Company advanced and reached the line of CAMPBELL STREET, “C” Company dropping three or four more posts between BUCHANAN STREET and CAMPBELL STREET on the line of PRINCES STREET, at the same time 2nd Lieutenant L A Gundry-White with the Battalion Bombers had forced the machine gun, which had been firing from N.W [northwest] of the Northern end of BUCHANAN STREET, to retire.

11.30 am. The Battalion was now holding the line of KING STREET with “C” Company, (less one platoon), holding the line of PRINCES STREET. We were here checked for the time being as our artillery was barraging extreme East edge of the wood. About 11 am our artillery barrage lifted, and “B” company was able to push forward and occupy the S.E [southeast] edge of the wood and East edge as far as ROTTON ROW. “A” Company were held up by a machine gun just North of the extreme east end of PRINCES STREET but after repeated attempted by 2nd Lieutenant L A Gundry-White, this machine gun for the time being retired slightly and “A” Company were able to get into touch with “B” Company at the East end of ROTTON ROW, and held a line from the East end of ROTTON ROW to the North end of KING STREET. “C” Company held the remainder of PRINCES STREET (Westwards) and “D” Company was holding South side. About 12.noon, the portion of the Wood South of PRINCES STREET was cleared.

12.40pm. On receipt of message to this effect from the Companies the 53rd Infantry Brigade, 10th Essex Regiment, 6th Royal Berks, and 8th (Suffolk Regiment were notified accordingly. At about 1.0 pm these three Battalions formed up for the attack, and attacked at about 2.0 pm on our barrage lifting. The Battalion now commenced to make a series of strong points round the East and S E [southeast] and South edge of the wood, and the snipers were sent up and made excellent practice from the South edge of the wood from the ridge north of GUILLEMONT. The afternoon was fairly quiet in the wood, but the enemy shelled the S E [southeast] corner of LONGUEVAL incessantly.

Battalion Headquarters which had been at the West end of Dover Street from the commencement of the fight now moved up to trench about 150 yards north of DOVER STREET, owing to the fact that the junction of DOVER and SLOANE STREETS with PALL MALL was a marked spot for the enemy’s artillery and the signaller’s cellar had been blown in.

Note:  The use of street names is a common military method of designating grid lines on a map to ensure troops would know how far to travel in combat operations and to maintain coordination with adjoining troops.  The names used did not actually correspond to real street names used within the cities and villages, but more realistically were names of trench lines which crisscrossed the battlefield.

The popular image of a trench assault is of a wave of soldiers, bayonets fixed, going "over the top" and marching in a line across no man's land into a hail of enemy fire. This was the standard method early in the war; it was rarely successful. More common was an attack at night from an advanced post in no man's land, having cut the barbed wire beforehand. In 1915, the Germans innovated with infiltration tactics where small groups of highly trained and well-equipped troops would attack vulnerable points and bypass strong points, driving deep into the rear areas. The distance they could advance was still limited by their ability to supply and communicate.

The role of artillery in an infantry attack was twofold. The first aim of a bombardment was to prepare the ground for an infantry assault, killing or demoralising the enemy garrison and destroying their defences. The duration of these initial bombardments varied, from seconds to days. Artillery bombardments prior to infantry assaults were often ineffective at destroying enemy defences, only serving to provide advance notice of an attack. The British bombardment that began the Battle of the Somme lasted eight days but did little damage to either the German barbed wire or their deep dug-outs, where defenders were able to wait out the bombardment in relative safety.^[43]

Once the guns stopped, the defenders had time to emerge and were usually ready for the attacking infantry. The second aim was to protect the attacking infantry by providing an impenetrable "barrage" or curtain of shells to prevent an enemy counter-attack. The first attempt at sophistication was the "lifting barrage" where the first objective of an attack was intensely bombarded for a period before the entire barrage "lifted" to fall on a second objective farther back. However, this usually expected too much of the infantry, and the usual outcome was that the barrage would outpace the attackers, leaving them without protection.